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GAS MARKETING BY THE OPERATOR UNDER A
JOA—UNRECOGNIZED REGULATORY RISKS AND
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
WILLIAM F. DEMAREST, JR.*
I. Introduction
Wellhead natural gas deregulation under the Natural Gas Policy Act of
19781 (NGPA) and the Wellhead Natural Gas Decontrol Act of 19892
(Decontrol Act), coupled with restructuring of the interstate natural gas
pipeline industry under Commission Order No. 636 (Order No. 636),3 have
led to significant changes in the way natural gas is marketed and sold. Yet
the role of operators of natural gas production properties (Operators) in
marketing of joint working interest owners’ production has changed
comparatively little despite wholesale changes in the regulatory structure of
the natural gas supply chain. Indeed, traditional arrangements under Joint
Operating Agreements (JOAs) often do not reflect current federal
regulatory policies. Many Operators continue to market or dispose of
natural gas attributable to the interest of other joint working interest owners
under JOAs developed long before, and without regard to, current natural
gas transportation policies of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission or FERC).
Recent changes in the enforcement powers of the Commission,
particularly the ability to impose “civil penalties” of up to $1 million per
violation per day for violations of the Natural Gas Act (NGA)4 or the
* Mr. Demarest is a Partner in Husch Blackwell LLP. Mr. Demarest is a 1972
graduate (magna cum laude) of Boston College Law School, where he was Articles Editor of
the Law Review. Mr. Demarest was the principal legislative draftsman of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432
(2006)).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 3431 (2006)).
3. Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations
Governing Self-Implementing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS. ¶ 30,939 (1992) [hereinafter Order
No. 636], order on reh’g, Order No. 636-A, F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS. ¶ 30,950 (1992), order
on reh’g, Order No. 636-B, 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,272 (1992), notice of denial of reh’g, 62
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,007 (1993), aff’d in part and vacated and remanded in part, United Dist. Cos.
v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996), order on remand, Order No. 636-C, 78 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,186 (1997).
4. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1009-58, § 314(b)(1), 119 Stat. 594, 690-91
(2005) (adding new NGA § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2006)).
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NGPA5 and the Commission’s continuing demand for strict compliance
with the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule raise significant questions for
Operators of natural gas production properties who market or otherwise
dispose of natural gas attributable to non-taking working interest owners
under out-dated JOAs. Failure to adjust traditional operating and marketing
practices under JOAs containing problematic or ambiguous language could
expose Operators to multi-million dollar civil penalties.
This article explores the regulatory risks associated with reliance by
Operators on typical provisions of JOAs and suggests solutions based on
well-recognized property law concepts.
II. Interstate Natural Gas Transportation Policy
The Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule and the related prohibition against
certain “buy/sell” transactions are recognized hallmarks of federal openaccess natural gas transportation policies. The evolution of these policies to
favor uniform “capacity release” mechanisms over pipeline-specific
“capacity brokering” programs, as well as the Commission’s jurisdictional
concerns relating to allocation of interstate transportation capacity, provide
the context in which the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule and the related
buy/sell prohibition were developed.6 Understanding this context is
important to appreciate fully the risk of violation of the Shipper-MustHave-Title Rule or the buy/sell prohibition posed by some natural gas
marketing arrangements under potentially problematic JOAs.
A. Origins of the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule
Prior to Order No. 636, the Commission approved a number of pipelinespecific programs for “brokering” the firm transportation capacity of
shippers (primarily converting firm sales customers) on interstate
pipelines.7 The common characteristic of these programs, the details of
5. Id. § 314(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 691 (amending NGPA § 504(b)(6)(a), 15 U.S.C. §
3414(b)(6)(A) (2006)).
6. The term “buy/sell” refers to a “commercial arrangement where a shipper holding
interstate pipeline capacity buys gas at the direction of, on behalf of, or directly from another
entity (e.g., an end-user), ships that gas through its interstate pipeline capacity, and then
resells an equivalent quantity of gas to the downstream entity at the delivery point.” RRI
Energy Inc. & RRI Energy Wholesale Generations, LLC, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,267, at P. 4
(2010) (citing Williams Energy Marketing & Trading Co., 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,219, at pp.
61,715-16 (2000)). As discussed below, these transactions are prohibited because they act as
a barrier to open access transportation on interstate pipelines.
7. E.g., Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., Docket No. CP90-134-000, 53 F.E.R.C.
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which varied from pipeline to pipeline, was the use of the firm shipper’s
capacity and priority-of-service to transport gas owned by a third-party.
Notably, the Shipper-Must-Have-Title “Rule” is nowhere to be found in
the Code of Federal Regulations where formal regulations of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission are codified. Rather, the “Rule” derives
from a precedent established in a pipeline-specific tariff proceeding that has
come to be applied generally to the interstate natural gas pipeline industry.
Thus, in Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.,8 the Commission addressed
perceived threats to open and non-discriminatory access to interstate
pipeline transportation capacity posed by brokering of transportation
capacity by interstate pipelines’ converting firm sales customers.
Jurisdictional sales customers had the ability to convert from firm sales
service to firm transportation service. The Commission perceived the
priority that these customers would enjoy for non-specific transactions as a
threat to the competitive framework of open-access transportation.
Consequently, the Commission imposed a tariff condition requiring that all
shippers have title to the gas at the time the gas was delivered to Texas
Eastern for transportation and while the gas was transported by the pipeline.
This tariff condition is the origin of the Commission’s Shipper-Must-HaveTitle Rule.
In adopting the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule in Texas Eastern, the
Commission stated:
The firm sales customer that transports gas to which it has title
need not use that gas to supply the needs of its system. It may
have Texas Eastern transport gas that the firm sales customer has
bought in the field specifically for a customer. In short, the firm
sales customer may use its priority to the pipeline’s capacity to
¶ 61,417 (1990); CNG Transmission Corp., Docket No. CP86-311-004, 55 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,189 (1991); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., Docket No. RP86-168-000 et al., 49
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,071 (1989); High Island Offshore System, Docket No. CP90-406-005, 53
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,126 (1990), 57 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,420 (1991); Kern River Gas Transmission Co.,
Docket No. CP89-2047-000 et al., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,069 (1990); Mojave Pipeline Co.,
Docket No. CP89-1-000 et al., 47 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,200 (1989); 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,069 (1990);
Oklahoma-Arkansas Pipeline Co., Docket No. CP90-187-000, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,019 (1990);
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., Docket No. CP88-136-007, 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248 (1989),
clarified, 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,378 (1989), order on reh’g, 51 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,170 (1990), order
on reh’g, 52 F.E.R.C.¶ 61,273 (1990); Texas Gas Transmission Corp., Docket No. CP88686-001, 55 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,208 (1991); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Docket No.
CP88-328-004, 52 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,277 (1990); U-T Offshore Sys., Docket No. CP90-1874-000
(1990); 57 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,418 (1991).
8. 37 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 (1986).
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act as an agent, or broker, of gas. What requiring the shipper to
have title does is to limit the firm sales customer’s use of that
priority to the situation intended, namely, the situation where the
customer assumes the risks of having [the interstate pipeline]
transport gas the customer owns for the purpose of reselling.9
Notably, the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule predates FERC Order No.
63610 and finds its roots in the Commission’s unwavering commitment to
promoting competition in natural gas markets by maximizing the
opportunity for new market participants to gain access to interstate pipeline
transportation capacity.
In this respect the Commission’s focus on enforcement of the ShipperMust-Have-Title Rule is more than slavish attention to a procedural
technicality. The Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule is the means by which
firm interstate transportation capacity, previously controlled largely by
converting pipeline system-supply sales customers, i.e., local distribution
companies and municipal distribution systems (collectively LDCs), became
available to independent natural gas marketers and producers. Without the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule, LDCs would likely have continued to
control substantial amounts of firm interstate transportation capacity in
excess of their system supply requirements. As a result, it is likely that
many markets which are competitive today, especially end-use markets
located “behind” LDC city-gates, would be far less competitive due to the
inability of marketers and producers to access the firm pipeline
transportation capacity to serve those markets. For these reasons, the Rule
represents a distinguishing characteristic of the Commission’s natural gas
transportation policy. Violation of the Rule is properly perceived by the
Commission as a fundamental threat to open and non-discriminatory access
to interstate transportation capacity.11
B. Evolution of the “Buy/Sell” Prohibition
As a consequence of efforts by market participants to comply with the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule on interstate pipelines on which
Commission-approved capacity brokering programs were in operation, a
9. Id. at p. 61,685.
10. See N. Ill. Gas Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,099, at p. 61,270 (1995); Tex. E. Gas Corp., 62
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,015, at p. 61,082 (1993).
11. See, e.g., In re Tenaska Mktg. Ventures, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,040 (2009) (Order
Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreements). Ironically, the shippers who were the
largest beneficiaries of the Rule, i.e., producers and independent gas marketers, have
frequently violated the Rule.
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practice developed within the industry whereby the shipper, the holder of
the interstate transportation capacity, would: (i) purchase the gas to be
transported (either from the ultimate recipient of the gas or from a thirdparty supplier designated by the ultimate recipient) at or prior to delivery of
the gas to the interstate pipeline for transportation;12 (ii) transport the gas
utilizing the shipper’s firm capacity on the transporting interstate pipeline;
and (iii) resell the gas to the ultimate recipient following completion of the
interstate transportation service.13
Obviously, buy/sell transactions
involving LDCs held the potential to provide discriminatory access to
interstate pipeline transportation capacity to end-users behind the LDCshipper’s city gate. Consequently such arrangements are inherently
anticompetitive. For that reason, such transactions became an early target
of producer-shippers who feared they would be disadvantaged in competing
for access to transportation capacity under such schemes.
As previously indicated, well before FERC Order No. 636, the
Commission itself recognized policy concerns respecting capacity
brokering in general and buy/sell programs in particular. Thus, in 1989, the
California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) approved buy/sell programs
for Southern California Gas Company (SoCal) and Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (PG&E) to utilize with respect to their interstate transportation
capacity on the interstate pipeline systems of El Paso Natural Gas Co. (El
Paso) and Transwestern Pipeline Co. (Transwestern) serving California.14
In February 1991, a group of producer/shippers filed a motion in the El
Paso and Transwestern capacity brokering certificate proceedings15
requesting the Commission to direct SoCal to conduct an “open season” in
connection with its capacity brokering program.16
On March 20, 1991, a year prior to Order No. 636, the Commission
issued a pair of orders amending El Paso’s and Transwestern’s blanket
open-access transportation certificates under which the capacity brokering
programs of each pipeline had been authorized.17 The Commission also
issued limited jurisdiction certificates to SoCal and PG&E authorizing their
12. The “buy” in buy/sell transactions.
13. The “sell” in buy/sell transactions.
14. In re Gas Util. Procurement Practices & Refinements to the Regulatory Framework
for Gas Utils., Dec. No. 90-09-089, 37 C.P.U.C.2d 583 (1990).
15. F.E.R.C. Docket Nos. CP88-433 and CP88-133.
16. Theoretically an “open-season” could have reduced the opportunity for anticompetitive discrimination by expanding access to the LDC’s brokered capacity on a
nondiscriminatory basis to all parties, not merely to end-users behind the LDC’s city gate.
17. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,318 (1991); Transwestern Pipeline Co.,
54 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,319 (1991).
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participation in the pipelines’ capacity release programs, effectively
asserting federal regulatory jurisdiction over the operation of the LDCs’
buy/sell programs.18 SoCal and PG&E were required to file written
procedures describing how they planned to implement the open access,
nondiscriminatory requirements for the assignment of capacity imposed by
the Commission.19
On April 19, 1991, both SoCal and PG&E made compliance filings
seeking approval of buy/sell programs previously established under the
auspices of the CPUC. SoCal included an overview of its buy/sell program,
triggering another round of controversy over the CPUC-approved buy/sell
programs. As a result, on August 14, 1991, the Commission issued orders
rejecting SoCal’s and PG&E’s proposed capacity brokering programs and
vacating the Commission’s prior orders authorizing capacity brokering
programs on the El Paso and Transwestern systems.20 While the
Commission acknowledged that it had previously approved transactions
that shared characteristics of the CPUC-approved buy/sell programs, the
Commission determined that it was necessary to examine more thoroughly
SoCal’s and PG&E’s buy/sell programs.21 The Commission therefore
established a technical conference
to reexamine whether and to what extent “buy/sell” programs,
such as are proposed in California, may have caused a shift of
the regulatory control and allocation of interstate pipeline
capacity away from the Commission to the state commissions
and the LDCs they regulate.22
The Commission expressed its belief that access to interstate pipeline
capacity must remain under the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction,23 a
belief that the Commission has continued to espouse in subsequent orders.24
This same jurisdictional concern had previously lead the Commission to
reevaluate more generally its capacity brokering policies in a Notice of

18. The assertion of federal jurisdiction effectively preempted CPUC authority over key
aspects of SoCal’s and PG&E’s buy/sell programs previously approved by the CPUC. See
54 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,318, at p. 61,988.
19. See id.
20. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289 (1991); Transwestern Pipeline Co.,
56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,288 (1991).
21. 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,288, at p. 62,120; 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289, at p. 62,133.
22. 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,288, at p. 62,120; 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289, at pp. 62,132-33.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., N. Ill. Gas Co., 90 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,308, at p. 62,000 (2000).
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Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR).25 This NOPR ultimately produced Order
No. 636.26 In its August 14, 1991 orders in El Paso and Transwestern, the
Commission determined that the concerns regarding capacity brokering
identified in the Order No. 636 NOPR were equally applicable to buy/sell
transactions.27
C. Order No. 636 and Companion Orders
In Order No. 636, the Commission adopted a uniform capacity release
program applicable to all open-access interstate pipelines. The uniform
capacity release program replaced the pipeline-specific capacity brokering
programs which the Commission had previously approved.28 In order to
ensure that interstate pipeline transportation capacity was reallocated on the
same basis on all pipelines, Order No. 636 mandated that all open-access
interstate pipelines implement a capacity release program through which
existing shippers could voluntarily reallocate all or part of their firm
transportation capacity rights to any person who wanted to obtain that
capacity.29 Consistent with this mandate, the Commission also stated that it
would not approve any new pipeline-specific capacity brokering
programs.30
In a companion order to Order No. 636, the terms and conditions of all
existing capacity brokering certificates were conformed to the Order No.

25. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Pipeline Service Obligations and
Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transp. Under Part 284 of the
Comm’n’s Regulations, F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS. ¶ 32,480, 56 Fed. Reg. 38,372 (1991)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. Part. 284).
26. Order 636, supra note 3.
27. 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,288, at p. 62,120; 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,289, at p. 62,132-33.
28. Order No. 636, supra note 3, at 30,939; 18 C.F.R. § 284.8 (2008).
29. Order No. 636, supra note 3, at 30,418; 18 C.F.R. § 284.8. Under the Commission’s
capacity release program, the “releasing” firm transportation capacity holder advises the
interstate pipeline of the conditions and extent under which the capacity holder wishes to
release capacity. Unless the transaction involves a “prearranged” release, the pipeline posts
the capacity release information and prospective replacement shippers have an opportunity
to agree to the releasing customer’s terms and conditions or to bid for the released capacity.
The pipeline is required to resell the released capacity to the replacement shipper meeting
the releasing customer’s terms and conditions. In the case of a posted prearranged deal, the
pipeline must contract with the replacement shipper if no better offer is received. If a better
offer is received, the pipeline is required to give the firm entitlement holder’s replacement
shipper an opportunity to match the better offer, thereby preempting the prospective bidding
shipper. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 59 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,031, at p. 61,078 (1992).
30. Order No. 636, supra note 3, at 30,416.
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636 capacity release mechanism.31 These adjustments were designed to
eliminate the potential for firm capacity holders to discriminate unduly in
their assignment of capacity, while facilitating the development of a
secondary market in transportation capacity, a development that would
itself be pro-competitive.32
In a second companion order to Order No. 636, the Commission
specifically addressed the SoCal and PG&E buy/sell programs.33 While
these buy/sell arrangements technically satisfied the Commission’s
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule, they threatened attainment of the
Commission’s pro-competitive transportation policies by undermining the
Commission’s ability to control the secondary market in interstate pipeline
transportation capacity, an objective the Commission sought to achieve
through its capacity release program under Order No. 636.34 The
Commission viewed its jurisdictional responsibilities as requiring the
Commission to prohibit the allocation of pipeline capacity through new
buy/sell agreements after the effective date of a pipeline’s capacity release
program established under Order No. 636.35 The decision to prohibit any
new buy/sell transactions was premised, in large part, on the Commission’s
concurrent action in Order No. 636 to ensure that all interstate pipeline
capacity reallocation was done under a uniform set of rules. The
Commission expressed the belief that to permit new buy/sell transactions to
utilize interstate pipeline capacity after the capacity release mechanism
went into effect would frustrate the Commission’s objective of a nationally
uniform program.36 The Commission concluded that allowing new buy/sell
arrangements to be negotiated outside the capacity release mechanism
would provide a major loophole, potentially inviting substantial
circumvention of the capacity release program.37
The foregoing illustrates that, despite sound commercial reasons for
arrangements that on their face satisfy the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule,
the Commission has not hesitated to strike down such arrangements when
necessary to preserve the Commission’s commitment to its capacity release
31. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 59 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,032, at p. 61,095 (1992).
32. 59 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,031, at p. 61,080.
33. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 59 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,031.
34. Id. at pp. 61,079-80.
35. Id. at p. 61,080. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that its “exclusive
jurisdiction over access to interstate pipeline capacity” did not require the Commission to
terminate all existing buy/sell transactions. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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program as one of the foundations of federal open-access transportation
policy.
D. Waivers of Shipper-Must-Have-Title
Since establishing the capacity release program, the Commission has
granted few waivers of the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule, generally
preferring that the industry modify its commercial arrangements to
accommodate the Rule rather than vice versa. Thus, the Commission has
issued limited waivers of the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule to facilitate
state retail unbundling programs,38 but denied a request for waiver of the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule and capacity release regulations to permit a
shipper to transfer title in transit in order to avoid the state gross receipts tax
in New York.39 Indeed, although the Commission granted a limited waiver
of the buy/sell prohibition to facilitate the Minerals Management Service’s
Royalty-In-Kind program,40 the mere fact of the waiver illustrates the reach
of the Rule in that no exception to the Rule could be implied from the
existence of another agency’s regulatory program.
More recently, in Order No. 712, the Commission has approved limited
exceptions to aspects of the capacity release program under narrowly
defined circumstances.41 Significantly, these limited waivers did not waive
the requirement that the shipper have title to the gas.42 Equally significant,
for purposes of evaluating the potential application of the Shipper-MustHave-Title Rule to gas marketing arrangements under JOAs, Order No. 712
did not extend the waivers granted in the Order to such gas marketing
arrangements.

38. E.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co., 84 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,119 (1998), order on compliance
filing, 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102 (1998); Nat’l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 86 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,179
(1999); Atlanta Gas Light Co., 88 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,150 (1999).
39. Enron Energy Servs., Inc., 84 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,222 at p. 62,063 (1998), order granting
clarification and denying reh’g, 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,221, at p. 61,905 (1998) (clarifying that
the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule applies even when an emergency arrangement exists
between the shipper and a third party).
40. Williams Energy Mktg. & Trading Co., 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,219 (2000).
41. Order No. 712, Promotion of a More Efficient Capacity Release Market, 123
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,286, at PP 148-53 (2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 284.8 (2008)).
42. Id. at P 152 n.147. The Commission did grant a limited exception to the buy/sell
prohibition. Id. at P 165.
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III. Regulatory Issues for Operators of Gas Producing Properties
A. Interstate Pipeline Tariff Issues
For Operators, the threshold inquiry concerning potential risks posed by
the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule is the extent to which such risks are
obviated by pipeline tariff language. As demonstrated below, subject to a
single limited exception, Commission-approved tariff language does not
provide protection against imposition of substantial civil penalties on
Operators/shippers who market natural gas attributable to non-taking
working interest owners pursuant to common JOA language if such
arrangements violate the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule.
1. Florida Gas Transmission Co., 64 FERC ¶ 61,302 (1993)
In Florida Gas Transmission Co. (FGT I),43 as part of a settlement of
restructuring dockets implementing Order No. 636 on the pipeline system
of Florida Gas Transmission Co. (Florida Gas Transmission), the pipeline
included tariff language providing a “good right to acquire title” exception
to the rule that a shipper must have title to the gas it transports. The
Commission noted that it had barred “most exceptions” to the ShipperMust-Have-Title Rule, including one for shippers who merely have the
“good right to deliver” the gas but who otherwise lack title.44
Consequently, the Commission required Florida Gas Transmission to
eliminate the offending tariff language except insofar as it permitted a
shipper with authority to market gas on behalf of a co-working interest
owner to satisfy the title requirement by warranting that it has good right to
deliver the gas.45 Regrettably, neither FGT I, nor its later companion case,
Florida Gas Transmission Co. (FGT II),46 provided any further explanation
or discussion of the authorized exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title
Rule for gas owned by a co-working interest owner where the shipper is
authorized to market the gas.
To the author’s knowledge, the tariff language approved by the
Commission in FGT I is the only express tariff exception to the ShipperMust-Have-Title Rule for Operator/shippers transporting gas owned by a
43. 64 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,302 (1993).
44. Id. at p. 63,206 n.25.
45. Id. at pp. 63,206-07; see also Fla. Gas Transmission Co. (FGT II), 65 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,336, at p. 62,593 (1993). The language the Commission ordered deleted would have
allowed a much broader exception, which in the Commission’s view would have permitted
the reinstitution of capacity brokering in the market area. 65 F.E.R.C. 61,336, at p. 62,593.
46. 65 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,336.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/2

2012]

GAS MARKETING BY THE OPERATOR UNDER A JOA

145

joint working interest owner where the Operator/shipper is authorized to
“market” the gas, typically under the terms of the JOA covering operations
of the producing property from which the gas was produced. A search of
tariff language through the Commission’s e-Library failed to disclose any
other interstate pipeline tariffs with similar language.
2. “Right To Deliver” vs. “Title” To Gas
A number of interstate pipeline tariffs contain language under which the
shipper must warrant that it either has “title” to the gas to be transported or
the “right to deliver” such gas. The threshold question, therefore, is
whether such tariff language constitutes an implied exception to the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule for Operators of natural gas properties
delivering gas of non-operating working interest owners under the
provisions of a JOA. Commission precedents directly on point strongly
suggest that such tariff language does not provide such an exemption and
that reliance on such tariff language by Operator/shippers may unwittingly
expose them to substantial civil penalties for violation of the Shipper-MustHave-Title Rule.47
a) Northern Natural Gas Co., Docket No. RP89-23-000
In another Commission proceeding, Docket No. RP89-23-000, Northern
Natural Gas Company (NNG) proposed, and the Commission initially
approved, tariff language which would have permitted transportation of gas
by NNG for shippers who warranted having either title to the gas or “good
right to deliver” the gas.48 NNG I was not the Commission’s final word on
the subject, however. On April 10, 1989, the Commission granted NNG’s
request for rehearing49 and approved deletion of the phrase “or good right to
deliver” from NNG’s tariff, provided that NNG included language
consistent with the Commission’s “current policy.”50 The Commission
subsequently made clear precisely what its “current policy” was.
Following Commission action on an intervening compliance filing by
NNG,51 on September 22, 1989, the Commission issued an order explaining
that the Commission’s “current policy” referenced in NNG II was to “allow
shippers . . . to transport gas only if they have good title to the gas or a

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

E.g., 64 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,302, at p. 63,206 n.25.
N. Natural Gas Co. (NNG I), 45 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,410, at p. 62,297 (1988).
N. Natural Gas Co. (NNG II), 47 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,040 (1989).
Id. at p. 61,115.
N. Natural Gas Co. (NNG III), 47 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,463 (1989).
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contractual right to acquire title to such gas.”52 NNG IV made clear that it
was not sufficient for the shipper to have only the “right to acquire title” at
the time of delivery of the gas to NNG for transportation.53 Rather, the
Commission unequivocally stated that “the Commission’s policy is that the
shipper must have actual title to the gas at the time of delivery, i.e., before
the pipeline commences service.”54
Notably, in FGT II the Commission responded to the contention by an
LDC supplied by Florida Gas Transmission that the Commission had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting an exception to the Shipper-MustHave-Title Rule in the market area, while permitting a supply-area
exception for Operator/shippers marketing gas of joint working-interest
owners. In FGT II the Commission cited NNG I for the dubious proposition
that the Commission had properly differentiated the market area from the
supply area.55 In light of the reversal of NNG I in NNG II and NNG IV, the
Commission’s citation of NNG I in FGT II can, at best, be described as
inexplicable. More importantly, this questionable citation cannot be viewed
as breathing new life into NNG I.
b) Columbia Gas Transmission Co., Docket No. RS92-5-000
In Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.,56 the Commission accepted
language in the tariffs of both Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.
(Columbia) and Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. (Columbia Gulf)
authorizing transportation for a shipper which had either title to the gas or

52. N. Natural Gas Co. (NNG IV), 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,350, at p. 62,147 (1989) (citing W.
Tex. Gathering Co., 45 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,483, at p. 62,508 (1988)). NNG IV also granted
NNG’s request for rehearing with respect to the timing of when the shipper must warrant it
has title. Notably, the question of whether the shipper must have title at the time the gas was
delivered for transportation (and not merely a “good right to deliver” the gas) was no longer
at issue. The Commission explained:
The Commission stated in West Texas Gathering that a shipper is required to
submit a letter with a request for service, certifying that the shipper has title to
the gas or a contractual right to acquire title. As Northern correctly states,
allowing shippers to guarantee that they have the right to acquire title to natural
gas, as an alternative to requiring that they have good title, is appropriate at the
time of the request for transportation service . . . .
Id. at p. 62,148 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at p. 62,148.
54. Id.
55. FGT II, 65 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,336, at p. 62,595 (1993).
56. 64 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,060 (1993).
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the “right to receive gas . . . at the delivery point.”57 In explaining these
provisions, the Commission stated:
Columbia proposes to add two new sections to its General Terms
and Conditions. Section 23 provides that shippers have good
title or right to receive gas free of liens at the delivery point, and
indemnifies Columbia from adverse consequences in the event
of breach of the warranty. Section 24 provides that the gas
delivered to Columbia at the receipt point be eligible for
transportation in interstate commerce and under the
Commission’s regulations.
This section also indemnifies
Columbia from adverse consequences in the event of breach of
the warranty. In reply comments, Columbia proposes to revise
these sections to clarify that these requirements may not be used
to hold a releasing shipper liable for a replacement shipper’s
conduct.58
Subsequently, in FGT II, the Commission explained that this provision
of the Columbia and Columbia Gulf tariffs does not serve to circumvent
capacity release. Rather, the Commission explained that it had relied on
Columbia’s explanation that the language exists so that a releasing shipper
may not be held liable for a replacement shipper’s conduct.59 Notably, in
FGT II the Commission also observed that section 24 of Columbia’s tariff
provides that the gas delivered to Columbia at the receipt point “must be
eligible for transportation in interstate commerce under the Commission’s
regulations”—in other words, that the shipper must have title to the gas.60
This observation is significant because many interstate pipeline tariffs also
contain similar generic regulatory compliance provisions which, under the
rationale expressed by the Commission in FGT II, would trump generic
“right-to-deliver” tariff language61 and prevent interpretation of such
language as constituting an implicit exception to the Shipper-Must-HaveTitle Rule.
The Commission’s explanation in FGT II that its approval of “right to
deliver” language in Columbia Gas did not establish an exception to the
57. Id. at p. 61,559 (emphasis added). The pertinent provisions of the Columbia and
Columbia Gulf tariff were identical. Id. at p. 61,498.
58. Id. at p. 61,559.
59. 65 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,336, at p. 62,593.
60. Id.
61. The “right to receive” language in the Columbia tariff is a variant on the “right to
deliver” language more commonly found in interstate pipeline tariffs.
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Shipper-Must-Have-Title requirement, where the purpose of the language
was indemnification,62 is consistent with the Commission’s rejection of
such language in NNG II where the purpose of the language was to
establish such an exception. In this respect, therefore, both Columbia Gas
and FGT II are consistent with NNG II and NNG IV in rejecting an
exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule based on “right to deliver”
language.
c) Kansas Pipeline Co., Docket No. CP96-152-29
The Kansas Pipeline proceeding is better known for the Commission’s
actions to collapse a scheme under which KansOk Partnership and its
affiliates sought to avoid NGA certificate regulation through a linked series
of “intrastate pipelines,” providing NGPA Section 311 service63 with
interconnecting “sausage link” interstate pipelines located only at the actual
crossing of state borders.64 Following the Commission’s determination that
the affiliated pipelines were a single, integrated jurisdictional interstate
pipeline subject to regulation under the NGA,65 the Commission had
occasion to address tariff language proposed by Kansas Pipeline in a
Compliance Filing.66 The proposed tariff language provided that “. . . both
Shipper and Kansas Pipeline warrant that it shall, at the time of delivery of
Gas to the other, have good title to or good right to deliver all such
Gas, . . . .”67 In ordering the language struck from the tariff, the
Commission stated, “This language is rejected without prejudice to Kansas
Pipeline revising this language to be compliant with the ‘Shipper has title
rule’.”68 Thus, the Kansas Pipeline proceeding provides further explicit
rejection by the Commission of tariff language which, if accepted, might
arguably have constituted an implicit exception to the Shipper-Must-HaveTitle Rule.

62. 65 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,336, at p. 62,593.
63. Under NGPA Section 311(a)(2), a non-jurisdictional “intrastate” pipeline may
provide “interstate” transportation service “on behalf of” statutorily identified “eligible
beneficiaries” without becoming subject to regulation as an “interstate pipeline” under the
NGA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3371(a)(2), 3431(a)(2) (2006).
64. KansOk Partnership, 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,242 (1995) (Order to Show Cause); KansOk
Partnership, 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,160 (1995), stayed in part, 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,293 (1995); Kan.
Pipeline Co., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,005 (1997), order on reh’g, 83 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,107 (1998).
65. 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,005, at p. 61,001.
66. Kan. Pipeline Co., 87 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,020 (1999).
67. Id. at p. 61,072, app. A (quoting proposed tariff Section 18.1).
68. Id.
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d) Cheyenne Plains Tariff
Another variant on tariff language which could be argued to constitute an
implicit exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule appears in the tariff
of Cheyenne Plains Gas Pipeline Company, LLC (Cheyenne Plains).
Section 7 of the General Terms and Conditions (GT&C) of Cheyenne
Plains’ currently effective tariff merely requires that the shipper have the
“right to ship” the gas delivered for transportation. Standing alone, this
tariff language arguably might not require the shipper to have title to the
gas being transported, so long as the shipper has “the right to ship the gas.”
Several affiliated shippers, who held capacity on Cheyenne Plains,
claimed to have “the right to ship” gas owned by their common parent
using the capacity held by each of the shipper-affiliates.69 Despite the
quoted tariff language, Commission Enforcement Staff asserted that the
affiliates violated the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule by transporting gas
owned by the affiliates’ common parent on capacity held by the affiliates.70
The question of whether the “right-to-ship” language constitutes an
exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule may not turn on
construction of Section 7 of the GT&C of the Cheyenne Plains tariff itself.
Rather, as the Commission noted in FGT II with respect to the Columbia
Gas and Columbia Gulf tariffs, the issue may turn on Section 4.13 of the
GT&C of the Cheyenne Plains tariff:
4.13 Statutory Regulation
The respective obligations of Transporter and Shipper under the
[Transportation Service Agreement] are subject to the laws,
orders, rules and regulations of duly constituted authorities
having jurisdiction.
This provision, like those in the Columbia/Columbia Gulf tariffs construed
by the Commission in FGT II as requiring compliance with the ShipperMust-Have-Title Rule, could be interpreted to preclude reading the “right to
ship” language of Section 7 of the GT&C of the Cheyenne Plains tariff as
an implicit exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule.
3. Conclusion
Absent language as explicit and narrow as that found in the tariff of
Florida Gas Transmission, interstate pipeline tariff provisions do not
69. Nat’l Fuel Mktg. Co., 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,042 (2009) (Order to Show Cause and
Notice of Proposed Penalties).
70. Id.
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provide an exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule for
Operator/shippers who transport natural gas attributable to a joint working
interest owner. Commission precedents clearly preclude reliance on “right
to deliver” or equivalent tariff language71 as creating an implicit exception
to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule. Indeed, other tariff language
requiring that transportation service under the tariff be fully compliant with
all applicable Commission regulations, which implicitly includes the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule, may also preclude reliance on such tariff
language to establish an exception to the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule.
B. Issues Posed By Joint Operating Agreements
The implications of the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule for transportation
of gas attributable to the ownership interest of non-taking interest owners
and marketed by an Operator under a JOA are made clear by a letter order
issued by the Commission to Southern Natural Gas Company in Docket No.
RP01-205-017.72 In that order, the Commission approved a “Master FT
Agreement” setting forth “one overall contractual entitlement to service,
which [several] shippers share.”73 In approving the Master FT Agreement,
however, the Commission imposed several conditions “[i]n order for [the]
arrangement to comply with the Commission’s Shipper-Must-Have-Title
Rule.”74 Among these is the requirement that “all shippers under the
Master FT Agreement are jointly and severally liable for all payment
obligations for the total Master contract transportation quantity.”75 The
Commission explained that if the individual shippers under the Master FT
Agreement are not liable for the total charges under the Agreement, they
“would be in violation of the Commission’s shipper-must-have-title policy
to the extent they used capacity in excess of that for which they were liable
to pay.”76 Typical Operator marketing arrangements fail to meet this test,
potentially exposing the Operator to civil penalties for violation of the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule.
Determining whether specific transportation activities of an Operator
violate the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule may turn on specific language of
a JOA or application of state property law. Specifically, determination of
who “owns” the natural gas being transported by an Operator of a
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Such as the “right to ship” language in the Cheyenne Plains tariff.
S. Natural Gas Co., 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,145 (2008).
Id. at P 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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producing property, where the gas is attributable to the interests of thirdparty working interest owners who did not take and dispose of their share of
production, appears to be critical to compliance. As discussed below,
typical JOA language authorizing the Operator to “market” or “dispose of”
production attributable to non-operating working interest owners who do
not take their share of production may not provide protection against
violation of the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule. By contrast, reliance on the
law of cotenancy-in-common generally provides a sound foundation for
assuring compliance with the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule.
It is impossible to draw specific conclusions respecting the regulatory
risks posed by Joint Operating Agreements because the pertinent language
varies so much among JOAs. Admittedly, the regulatory risks identified in
this article are not associated with every JOA. Nevertheless, the magnitude
of the potential economic consequences of violating the Shipper-MustHave-Title Rule warrant examination of specific JOA language to
determine whether the JOA presents a substantial regulatory risk. While it
is not possible to do so comprehensively in an article such as this,
examination of representative JOA language is illustrative and can provide
useful guidance for examination of specific JOA language.
The following representative language, typical of that found in many
JOAs, is excerpted from an actual JOA:
In the event any party shall fail to make the arrangements
necessary to take in kind or separately dispose of its
proportionate share of the oil and/or gas produced from the
Contract Area, Operator shall have the right, . . . but not the
obligation, to purchase such oil and/or gas or sell it to others . . .
for the account of the non-taking party at the price which
operator is receiving for its production. Any such purchase or
sale by Operator shall be subject always to the right of the
owner of the production to exercise at any time its right to take
in kind, or separately dispose of, its share of all oil and/or gas not
previously delivered to purchaser. Any purchase or sale by
Operator of any other party’s share of oil and/or gas shall be
only for such reasonable periods of time as are consistent with
the minimum needs of the industry under the particular
circumstances, but in no event for a period in excess of thirty
(30) days.
The italicized language of the illustrative JOA text clearly contemplates
one of two transactions:
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1. a “purchase” by the Operator of the “non-taking party’s” share
of production (option 1); or
2. a “sale” by the Operator of the “non-taking party’s” share of
production “to others . . . for the account of the non-taking party”
(option 2).
This ambiguity is a source of regulatory risk which may manifest itself as
exposure to civil penalties.
The first construction (option 1) generally would not expose the Operator
to risks of civil penalties from violation of the Shipper-Must-Have-Title
Rule because the Operator would own the gas. However, absent
documentation (which is frequently missing or non-existent) that the
Operator has actually purchased the gas under option 1, there is little to
assure that the JOA will be construed in such a favorable manner. This risk
is heightened if the actual conduct of the Operator contradicts such a
theoretical construction, which is often the case where the Operator’s
“marketing” activities are more consistent with an agency relationship than
an outright purchase.
If not accompanied by a prior “purchase” transaction (option 1), the
second option involves characteristics of an agency relationship which, in
practice, is typical of the “marketing” activities undertaken by many
Operators with respect to gas attributable to a “non-taking party’s” working
interest. If the JOA is construed as establishing an agency relationship
(option 2), the utilization by the Operator/shipper of its own interstate
pipeline transportation capacity to transport natural gas owned by a
non-taking working interest owner in connection with the “marketing”
of such gas by the Operator is likely to be found to violate the ShipperMust-Have-Title Rule and thereby expose the Operator/shipper to
substantial civil penalties.77
IV. Alternatives to Reduce Regulatory Risks
The foregoing discussion of potential regulatory risks raises the question
of how to reduce the risks inherent in ambiguous JOA language and thereby
increase the likelihood of regulatory compliance. What follows are three
alternatives to reduce regulatory risk:
77. Marketing of a non-operating working interest owner’s gas under a JOA would
present regulatory problems under the Commission’s buy/sell prohibition only in the
unlikely event that the Operator sold the gas back to the non-operating working interest
owner following the transportation of the gas in interstate commerce.
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• The first alternative is to revise potentially ambiguous JOA language
to recognize expressly the issues associated with compliance with the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule and to eliminate the ambiguity which
typifies “traditional” JOA provisions dealing with disposition of production
attributable to the working interest of a non-taking interest owner. For
reasons discussed below, this is often easier said than done.
• The second alternative is to establish documentation and accounting
practices which comport with a reading of existing ambiguous JOA
language in a manner which reduces the risk of violating the Shipper-MustHave-Title Rule. This alternative has the practical advantage that it may be
easier to implement. Nevertheless, this alternative is not without its own
drawbacks as discussed below.
• State property law principles governing ownership of property as
cotenants-in-common may provide a third alternative to reduce or eliminate
regulatory risks posed by ambiguous JOA language.78 Depending on state
law, reliance on common law principles governing cotenancy-incommon may be preferable for reducing regulatory risk to either of the
alternatives considered in this article.
A. Amending Existing JOA Provisions
As suggested, one alternative is to revise potentially ambiguous JOA
language to recognize expressly the issues associated with compliance with
the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule and eliminate the ambiguity which
typifies “traditional” JOA provisions dealing with disposition of production
attributable to the working interest of a non-taking interest owner. In each
case, the amendatory language must be tailored to the specific, potentially
problematic JOA language. In this regard, the problematic language on
which an amendment must focus is any language which can be construed as
establishing an agency relationship under which it may be argued that an
Operator/shipper, who is marketing a non-taking interest owner’s share of
production, lacks “title” to the gas during transportation of the gas by an
interstate pipeline. The amendment must render such language inoperative.
By contrast, JOA language which clearly places the Operator in an
ownership position, e.g., language under which the Operator purchases the
non-taking interest owner’s share of production, should be preserved and

78. Ironically, in at least one respect, the law of cotenancy-in-common increases the
risks inherent in ambiguous JOA language by reducing the likelihood that such language
will be construed as consistent with a low-regulatory-risk purchase by the Operator (option
1) rather than a sale (option 2) under a high-regulatory-risk agency relationship.
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made the exclusive remedy for the non-taking interest owner’s failure to
take.
This approach is not without practical difficulties. First, this approach
requires a case-by-case review of JOA language. Where a single Operator
operates different properties under multiple JOAs, such case-by-case
review can become especially burdensome. In addition, where multiple
JOAs exist, this approach may entail multiple “fixes” tailored to curing
differing JOA language. The need for different amendments to specific
JOAs can be difficult to implement and challenging to administer over time.
Second, JOAs are typically complex documents with multiple interrelated
provisions. Drafting targeted amendments to such Agreements presents its
own challenges.
However, an even bigger challenge for the Operator desiring to
implement such amendments may be anticipated in the form of requests by
non-operating interest owners to modify other provisions of the JOA (with
which the Operator may be perfectly content). Non-operating interest
owners may be expected to be unsympathetic to the “problem” facing the
Operator—the common view may be that it is, after all, the Operator’s
problem. Moreover, the inherent complexity of most JOAs may tend to
make non-operators leery of any modification, with the “if it ain’t broke,
why fix it” mentality coming to the fore. Under such circumstances,
obtaining affirmative consent of all the joint interest owners to a single
amendment may be especially difficult.
B. Documentation and Accounting Procedures
The second alternative involves development of documentation,
including accounting procedures, to support the contention that the actual
practice of the Operator under arguably ambiguous JOA language has been
consistent with a construction which does not lead to violation of the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule. This alternative is not without its own
challenges. Such documentation would be designed to confirm the
“purchase” of the non-taking working interest owners’ gas by the Operator.
The difficulty is that the most credible forms of such documentation would
involve some confirmation from the non-taking interest owner. For some
of the same reasons that it may be difficult to obtain the consent of the nontaking interest owner to amend the JOA, non-taking interest owners may be
reluctant to execute documentation confirming a sale of the non-taking
interest owner’s gas to the Operator.
In addition to appropriate documentation, the effectiveness of this
alternative requires the Operator’s internal accounting practices to be
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consistent with a wellhead purchase and sale transaction. The degree of
difficulty involved in assuring such consistency will vary depending on the
company and its historic accounting policies. The challenge of assuring
compliance should not, however, be underestimated.
This solution is also not without risks of undesirable economic
consequences. This is likely to be an especially serious concern where
federal royalty rules apply, and may also be a concern under non-federal
leases depending on the royalty calculation principles in effect under the
royalty language of the leases involved.79
C. Property Law—Ownership Of Oil And Gas
Depending on specific state property law, the third and (in the author’s
opinion) preferable alternative is to rely on the law of cotenancy-incommon to avoid the problems presented by ambiguous JOA language
regarding the Operator’s actions with respect to gas attributable to the
interest of the non-taking interest owner.
1. Cotenancy-In-Common
The seminal case in the field is Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.80
Earp defined the relationship among and between working interest owners
in oil and gas leases as that of cotenants-in-common. The courts of
Oklahoma and other producing states have strictly adhered to the principle
established in Earp.81 In Torgeson, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
succinctly described the critical rights of such cotenants under
circumstances pertinent here:
The owners of undivided portions of oil and gas rights in and
under real estate are tenants in common and each of them may
enter upon the premises to explore for and develop gas and oil.82
While courts have consistently recognized one cotenant’s general right to
develop and dispose of a well’s production without the consent of another
79. Analysis of the application of royalty rules to the Operator’s purchase of the nontaking interest owner’s gas is beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to note that
such a purchase arrangement may affect the royalty burden for the non-taking interest
owner.
80. 27 P.2d 855, 858 (Okla. 1933).
81. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dyco Petrol. Corp., 782 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Okla. 1989);
Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986); Fife v. Thompson, 708 S.W.2d 611
(Ark. 1986); Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 49 (Okla. 1964); Torgeson v. Connelly, 348
P.2d 63, 70 (Wyo. 1959).
82. Torgeson, 348 P.2d at 70.
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cotenant, several cases have also addressed the narrower question of
whether this right enables one cotenant to sell one hundred percent of
current production when another cotenant is unable or chooses not to sell its
proportionate share of the production.83 In Anderson, Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Company (Panhandle) purchased natural gas from various working
interest owners with which Panhandle had contracted. Panhandle refused,
however, to purchase gas from the working interest owners of the well with
which Panhandle had not contracted. The non-contracted owners brought
an action against Panhandle for conversion of their gas, seeking an order
requiring Panhandle to purchase the uncontracted working interest owners’
share of production (or to pay the uncontracted working interest owners
their proportionate share of the proceeds from Panhandle’s purchase of the
full well stream). The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the premise of
this claim on the ground that “because each cotenant has the right to . . .
market production under the common law,” sale of the production by one
cotenant ordinarily does not involve conversion of the uncontracted
cotenant’s gas by the purchaser.84
Thus, the “majority rule” is that when one cotenant-in-common
chooses not to take and dispose of its proportionate share of oil or gas,
the other cotenants have the right to take, sell and dispose of the nontaking owner’s share of the oil or gas (subject to the obligation to
account) and an imbalance is created.85 Although the courts generally do
not speak in terms of who holds “title” to the production taken by the taking
interest owner in excess of its proportionate working interest share (where
not all working interest owners exercise their right to take their share of
production in kind), it appears to be reasonably well settled that title to
the production vests in the taking interest owner at the time of
production and no “purchase” of production from the non-taking interest
owner by the taking interest owner is involved.86 Thus, application of the
83. E.g., Anderson, 782 P.2d 1367; Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer’s Gas Co., 870
F.2d 563, 569-70 (10th Cir. 1989).
84. Anderson, 782 P.2d at 1371-72. Much of the case law relating to cotenancy-incommon of natural gas pertains to the obligation of a selling cotenant to “account” to the
non-selling cotenant.
85. Torgeson, 348 P.2d at 70. This is true unless a contemporaneous accounting occurs,
in which case no imbalance exists. Any imbalance which is created may be resolved by
balancing in-kind or by cash balancing, either on a periodic basis or at the end of production.
See Kaiser-Francis, 870 F.2d at 569-70 (discussing forms of balancing); Eugene Kuntz, Gas
Balancing Rights And Remedies In The Absence Of A Balancing Agreement, 35 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13.03[2] (1989) (discussing majority and minority rules).
86. David E. Pierce, The Law of Disproportionate Gas Sales, 26 TULSA L.J. 135, 140
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common law rules governing cotenancy-in-common should be dispositive
of the “ownership” issue for natural gas regulatory purposes.
2. JOAs and “Cotenancy-Like” Relationships
The subject becomes more complicated (not to say muddled), however,
where so-called “cotenancy-like” relationships are created under other
contractual arrangements, including, for example, Joint Operating
Agreements.87 Professor Pierce points out that “reported cases have failed
to clearly distinguish between common law cotenancy and cotenant-like
relationships created by contract.”88
A number of cases discuss whether language in JOAs establishes the
existence of “cotenancy like” ownership of the natural gas or oil
production.89 Unfortunately, the cases are far from clear as to the attributes
of “cotenancy like” relationships created under JOAs as compared to the
well-established characteristics and consequences of common law
cotenancy-in-common. Also less than clear is the potential for provisions
of a JOA to undermine the otherwise applicable consequences of the law of
cotenancy-in-common to ownership of oil or natural gas in excess of a
cotenant’s proportionate working interest share, where the other cotenants
choose not to “take” their share of production in kind. Thus, the case law is
consistent with the previous observations in this article respecting the
inherent ambiguity in common JOA language and the potential regulatory
risks flowing from such ambiguity where ownership rather than an agency
relationship is essential to compliance with the Shipper-Must-Have-Title
Rule.
3. Structuring Transactions To Reduce Regulatory Risk
Relying on the existence of common law cotenancy-in-common under
the oil and gas leases is preferable to reliance on the terms of the JOA as the
basis for the shipper’s “ownership” of the production not taken by the nonoperating working interest owner in the leases. Unlike the first alternative,
which may require the consent of the non-operating interest owners to
(1990) (the production “is owned” solely by the taking cotenant); Kuntz, supra note 85, at
13.03[3] (non-taking cotenant has no “ownership” in production taken by the taking
cotenant).
87. See Pierce, supra note 86, at 141; Harrell v. Samson Res. Co., 980 P.2d 99, 103
(Okla. 1998).
88. Pierce, supra note 86, at 141.
89. See, e.g., Harrell, 980 P.2d at 103; Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 974 F.2d 130, 134 (10th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting cotenancy-like ownership under JOA); Questar Pipeline Co. v.
Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Doheny).
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differing amendments tailored to complex JOA language, reliance on
common law principles of the law of cotenancy-in-common may be
implemented unilaterally by the Operator on a uniform basis. This can
have distinct advantages for the Operator who administers numerous JOAs
with large numbers of non-operating interest owners.
Thus, typical JOA language gives the Operator the “right but not the
obligation” either: (a) to purchase (option 1) or (b) to sell (option 2) the
non-taking interest owner’s share of production. As noted, typically such
JOA language does not require the Operator to elect either option. Under
such circumstances the Operator can avoid application of potentially
problematic JOA language by unilaterally notifying the non-operating
interest owners that the Operator will not exercise either “option” under the
JOA. Rather, the Operator may achieve its objective of minimizing its own
risk of violating the Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule by announcing that the
Operator will instead exercise its right as a cotenant-in-common of the nontaking interest owner to take the production in excess of the Operator’s
share as its own, creating an imbalance in the ground.90
JOAs often contain language for resolution of any imbalance created by
the exercise of the Operator’s common law rights as a cotenant-in-common.
Typically, accounting mechanisms of JOAs are consistent with the common
law requirement for the working interest owner who “takes” more than his
proportionate working interest share to “account” to its cotenants. In
theory, no substantial economic difference needs to follow from (1) the
Operator exercising a contract-based option to dispose of the non-taking
interest owner’s gas under the JOA91 or (2) the Operator proceeding under
the law of cotenancy-in-common. Such might be the case in theory, but in
practice, whether the imbalance is resolved “in-kind” or by “cash
balancing,” the timing of such imbalance resolution or “accounting” and the
precise formula for cash balancing generally make resolution of imbalances
under the balancing provisions of JOAs less than optimal from the
viewpoint of the under-produced interest owner.
Thus, opposition to the Operator’s unilateral action may be anticipated
from non-taking interest owners. This anticipated opposition may be
diminished, however, by an agreement by the Operator to “account”
contemporaneously for the value of the gas taken in excess of the
90. If an amendment to the JOA is nevertheless still deemed desirable, the threatened
exercise of this common law remedy may “soften” non-operator resistance to such an
amendment.
91. Whether by “purchase” (option 1) or “sale” (option 2) of the non-taking interest
owner’s share of production.
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Operator’s working interest share of production, where value is determined
in the same manner as the Operator historically accounted to the non-taking
interest owners under the JOA.92
Neither the balancing language of the JOA, nor the terms of an
agreement between the Operator and non-taking interest owners
respecting the method of accounting by the Operator to the non-taking
interest owner, should have regulatory consequences under the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule. Although the issue is an open one, it may
prove to be determinative that rarely could either such balancing language
or the terms of such an accounting agreement be construed as a subterfuge
to escape NGA jurisdiction, as the buy/sell transactions prohibited in Order
No. 63693 and El Paso94 were construed. Where a transaction is otherwise
properly structured under the law of cotenancy-in-common, the
arrangement should not violate either the buy/sell prohibition or the
Shipper-Must-Have-Title Rule.
V. Conclusion
The Commission is armed with substantial remedial powers, including
civil penalties under the NGA (and NGPA), that can make an error in
structuring transportation and related arrangements extremely costly. These
regulatory risks warrant careful attention to the structure of natural gas
transportation arrangements to assure that regulatory risks are minimized.
Particular care must be taken by Operators who utilize their own
interstate transportation capacity with respect to “disposing of” or
“marketing” a non-taking interest owner’s share of production under a
JOA. While the law of cotenancy-in-common provides a sound basis for
avoiding undesirable regulatory consequences, JOAs sometimes threaten to
muddy the waters. Ambiguous JOA language, in conjunction with the
practice of the Operator, may lead to construing the conduct of the Operator
as selling the non-taking interest owner’s share of production under an
agency arrangement. If so construed, violation of the Shipper-Must-HaveTitle Rule would likely follow as, with a singular exception, interstate
pipeline tariffs do not provide an implied exception to the Rule under such
92. It may be anticipated that non-operators would be more willing to execute such a
simple agreement than a more complex amendment to the JOA because the economic
consequences of such an agreement would be favorable to the non-operator as compared to
those which would flow from the Operator’s refusal to continue to “market” the nonoperator’s gas and to proceed under the balancing provisions of the JOA.
93. Order No. 636, supra note 3, at 30,416.
94. 59 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,031 (1992).
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circumstances. Wherever possible, therefore, reliance on the law of
cotenancy-in-common is preferable to relying on “cotenancy-like”
relationships created under JOAs.
The provisions of JOAs should be carefully reviewed for consistency
with the law of cotenancy-in-common on which critical regulatory
consequences may depend. Where necessary, appropriate amendments or
agreements should be considered to confirm that the Operator/shipper
acquired “ownership” of production otherwise attributable to the interest of
another working interest owner under the common law principles of
cotenancy-in-common. Amendments to the JOA are particularly important
in jurisdictions which do not apply the majority rule of cotenancy-incommon, as the JOA may then provide the only defense to a potential
regulatory violation. Failure to do either may lead to undesirable and costly
regulatory consequences under ambiguous JOA language.
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